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Abstract In order to understand how the environment
influences business owner/managers’ attitudes towards tax
morale, we build a theoretical model based on a neo-in-
stitutionalist framework. Our model combines three com-
plementary perspectives on institutions—normative,
cultural–cognitive and regulatory–instrumental. This
enables a broader understanding of factors that influence
business owner–managers’ attitudes towards tax evasion.
We test the resulting hypotheses using regression analysis
on survey data on business owner/managers in Latvia—a
transition country, which has undergone massive institu-
tional changes since it was part of the Soviet Union over
25 years ago. We find that legitimacy of the tax authorities
and the government (normative dimension), feeling of
belonging to the nation (cultural–cognitive dimension) and
perceptions of the risk and severity of punishment (regu-
latory–instrumental dimension) are all associated with
higher tax morale for business owners and managers.
Keywords Entrepreneurship  Informal economy 
Identity  Institutions  New institutionalism  Business
owners/managers  Tax evasion  Tax morale  Trust
Introduction
In recent years, tax avoidance by businesses has attracted
much media attention. Some large corporations have been
in the news for employing tax avoidance schemes to legally
avoid paying large amounts of tax. In turn, smaller-scale
firms that aim to decrease their tax liabilities tend to rely on
a different strategy: tax evasion by engaging in the infor-
mal economy/or not declaring all of their activities to the
tax authorities. It is the latter phenomenon which, due to its
dispersed character, is less understood (Alm and McClellan
2012).
Several studies argue that such deviant forms of firm
behaviour, such as tax evasion, while contributing to firm
growth, can also bring some societal benefits (Sauka 2008;
Davidsson and Wiklund 2001; Warren 2003). From a nar-
row utilitarian perspective, if the private sector spending is
more efficient, the money should stay there (for discussion,
see: Benk et al. 2015; Preobragenskaya and McGee 2016).
However, such arguments can only be seen as describing a
second-best outcome. Like rent seeking and litigation, tax
evasion comes with a deadweight cost: resources are wasted
both by firms in evading taxes and by the government in
trying to identify and punish tax evaders. In the longer term,
tax evasion may lead to a vicious circle, where a shrinking
tax base falls on fewer businesses that comply fully, in turn
pushing even more entrepreneurs into the informal econ-
omy. This leads to dual business structures: formal versus
informal. This duality not only implies suboptimal choices
of business strategies, but is also detrimental to the forma-
tion of high growth businesses (Estrin and Mickiewicz
2012). Under such a scenario, economic development both
at the local and at the country level suffers.
In the rational choice explanation of tax evasion, the
amount of tax an individual chooses to pay depends on the
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individual’s (income-defined) expected utility of the ben-
efits of not paying taxes, compared to the risk of being
caught evading taxes and the cost of the consequent pun-
ishment (Allingham and Sandmo 1974; Yitzhaki 1974).
However, one of the main conclusions from empirical
research is that tax evasion is much lower than can be
explained by expected utility defined in financial terms
alone (see: Torgler 2003a; Feld and Frey 2010; and Torgler
2002 for overview of evidence from experiments). In this
light, as emphasised by Alm and Torgler (2011), the central
question in the tax evasion literature is not ‘‘why entre-
preneurs evade taxes’’ but ‘‘why so many entrepreneurs pay
taxes’’—despite a relatively low likelihood of being caught
evading accounted for the severity of punishment. To
explain this discrepancy, the concept of tax morale—a
moral obligation to pay taxes and ‘‘a belief in contributing
to society by paying taxes’’ (Torgler and Schneider 2009,
p. 230)—has gained relevance (Alm et al. 1992; Andreoni
et al. 1998; Luttmer and Singhal 2014). Evidence indicates
that at the aggregate level, countries with higher levels of
tax morale have smaller shadow economies (Torgler and
Schneider 2009; Halla 2012) and that individuals with
higher levels of tax ethics are less likely to evade taxes
(Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008; Wenzel 2005). The purpose
of this paper is to analyse how the institutional context
drives the tax morale of business owner/managers.
We contribute to the literature on tax morale in three
ways. First, we aim to fill one particular gap in this liter-
ature where studies focusing on firms are still scarce (Alm
and McClellan 2012) by empirically exploring potential
determinants of the tax morale of business owner/man-
agers. Much of the literature considers either tax morale or
income tax evasion (a) by individuals (recent examples:
McGee et al. 2015; Yew et al. 2015; Wei and McGee 2015;
McGee et al. 2016) or (b) by large corporations (recent
example: Jones and Temouri 2016). Yet most of the busi-
ness activity falls between these two, in small- and med-
ium-sized firms—on which we focus.
In empirical studies, self-employed and business owners
have been found to have lower tax morale than other indi-
viduals (Alm et al. 2010; Lago-Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as 2010;
Torgler 2003b, d, 2012; Yew et al. 2015). While these
studies have shown that there are differences between the
employed and self-employed, the data used in these studies
on business owners and managers are limited and prevent
greater focus on these individuals and the circumstances of
their businesses. We have gathered data from 220 business
owners and managers which allow us to explore focus on
them and enable us to control for different business char-
acteristics which may affect tax morale. Moreover, a direct
focus on the owner/managers’ tax morale is critical, given
the role of owner/manager attitudes and intentions in shap-
ing business strategies (Wiklund et al. 2003), including
entrepreneurial activities that spill over into informality
(Webb et al. 2009 Alm and McClellan 2012).
Our second contribution is that through focusing on tax
morale in businesses, we can integrate the research on tax
morale and the literature on informality. Informality is
usually treated as a dichotomy: firms are either fully
informal or fully formal. Thus, the literature on the infor-
mal economy distinguishes between those with either all
legal or all illegal production of goods and services that is
deliberately concealed from public authorities (Schneider
et al. 2010). However, this strict division does not reflect
reality; as De Castro et al. (2014) point out, there are many
shades of grey in between. Companies may be often offi-
cially registered, yet in part adopt illegal means, say, illegal
employment and related non-compliance in tax reporting
(including not paying social insurance contributions). As
emphasised by Webb et al. (2009), such cases are more
difficult to detect than those of ventures that adopt illegal
ends. Yet, by focusing on tax evasion and tax morale in
business we can help shed light on this grey area and
show how it is useful for these two literatures to be
combined. Accordingly, we are interested in registered
companies that follow legal ends (producing legal prod-
ucts), but may consider using illegal means to do so. In
contrary to unregistered businesses that are illegal by
definition, in legally registered businesses, owner/man-
agers decide the extent to which they evade taxes and, as
we argue in this paper, these choices are influenced by
institutional systems.
While the role of the institutions in influencing tax
morale has been explored previously (Cohen et al. 2015;
Hanousek and Palda 2004; Hug and Spo¨rri 2011; Lago-
Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as 2010; Torgler 2003b, c, 2012), our
third contribution is to provide an integrated theoretical
framework, which allows us to identify theoretically which
are the critical institutional factors. This framework,
inspired by Scott’s (2014) new institutionalism, is adopted
to explain how the environment influences the tax morale
of business owner/managers. It combines three comple-
mentary perspectives on institutions—normative, cultural–
cognitive and regulatory–instrumental—allowing us to
unpack different institutional factors affecting tax morale.
It provides a broad perspective of how institutions can
affect individuals. The institutions not only influence
individual behaviour through sanctions as the regulatory
perspective suggests, but also through affecting normative
judgments by individuals on how things should be done.
Furthermore, institutions provide cultural–cognitive
frameworks; individuals adopt specific (and multiple)
social identities that define their roles and in turn constrain
how individuals behave by not even considering any other
behaviour as it contradicts what is taken for granted (Scott
2014, p. 44; 68).
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Last but not least, our contribution is in applying this
framework in the context of a transition economy. Latvia,
being a transition country with a multi-ethnic make-up,
provides an environment with great institutional hetero-
geneity on the institutional variables. Our choice to draw
on the data from a transition country is informed by the
proposition that such countries are a good fit for analysing
the impact of the environment on tax morale (Torgler
2003d; Alm et al. 2006; McGee et al. 2015; Yew et al.
2015; Preobragenskaya and McGee 2016). Latvia has
undergone huge institutional changes in the last 25 years,
transitioning from a command economy when it was part
of the Soviet Union, back to independence with a market
economy and now becoming integrated into the European
Union. As Torgler (2003a) and Alm et al. (2006) explain,
this kind of transition requires a major transformation in
the tax system, including the implementation of direct
taxation of firms and individuals. Moreover, as we will
discuss further below, the characteristics of the command
economy under the Soviet Union might have created strong
grounds for distrust and dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment. Such attitudes are not likely to change fast and thus
might still persist in Latvia two decades after the start of
the transition process (Putnins and Sauka 2015, 2016).
Thus, in transition countries like Latvia, all the three ele-
ments of institutional frameworks (normative, cognitive
and regulatory) are evolving and may affect different
owner/managers in dissimilar ways, generating hetero-
geneity that is of interest for empirical research.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section
introduces the conceptual framework for analysing deter-
minants of tax morale. We then proceed with describing
the methodology—a survey of owner/managers, which is
followed by the results sections. The paper concludes with
conclusions and implications.
Determinants of Tax Morale: A Framework
This section presents the theoretical framework for the
study. We adopt categories introduced by the new institu-
tionalism which are framed as the three ‘‘institutional pil-
lars’’, or complementary institutional perspectives (Scott
2014).
Scott (2014, p. 33) defines institutions as ‘‘…cognitive,
normative, and regulative structures and activities that
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour’’. These
different facets of institutions shape the norms adopted by
individuals and affect their behaviour. Each system pro-
vides a different mechanism for compliance (or non-com-
pliance) with the institutional framework. Seeking to
explain tax morale, we will describe (1) the normative
mechanisms as those that may generate social obligation
based on norms seen as legitimate, (2) the cognitive
mechanisms as representing adoption of social identities
with a corresponding behaviour that is seen as the way to
act and (3) regulatory mechanisms that affect an individual
through perceived sanctions. All individuals and firms are
confronted and shaped by institutions via these three dif-
ferent mechanisms, even if the institutional environment is
often not uniform in the way it affects them (Scott 2014).
This theoretical framework of the study is summarised
in Fig. 1. The relational institutional systems, in which
business owner/managers (entrepreneurs) are embedded,
influence their tax morale, i.e. their attitudes towards tax
evasion, via the three institutional aspects discussed above
(normative, cognitive and regulatory).
Institutions have been studied in tax morale literature
previously as can be seen in Table 1 below in which we
present empirical studies from 2007–2016 which have
included an analysis of institutions. However, by using
Scott’s framework and by bringing the three perspectives
Fig. 1 Theoretical framework
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Table 1 A selection of studies from 2007 to 2016 including institutional variables to explain tax morale
Reference Dependent variable Institutional dimensions Sample and
econometrics
Source of data Findings
Konrad and
Qari
(2012)
Tax compliance: ‘‘How
important is it never to
try to evade taxes’’
Patriotism Individuals in eight
countries. OLS and
ordered probit
International
social survey
programme
2004 and
2003
Positive association
between tax compliance
and patriotism
Torgler
(2012)
Tax morale: always or
never justified—cheating
on tax payments if you
get the chance
Trust in government; trust
in justice system; trust in
EU; governance quality;
religiosity
Individuals in ten
Eastern European
countries that
joined the
European Union by
2007. Weighted
ordered probit
European
values survey
1999/2000
and 2008
All institutional variables
positively related to tax
morale
Heinemann
(2011)
Tax morale: always or
never justified—cheating
on tax payments if you
get the chance
Economic crisis;
generosity of welfare
system; confidence in
parliament; patriotism
Individuals in 20
OECD countries.
Probit
World values
survey—four
waves from
1981 to 2003
Presence of economic
crisis and more generous
welfare systems are
associated with lower tax
morale and the two
interact to reinforce this
relationship. Confidence
in parliament and
patriotism is positively
related to tax morale
Hug and
Spo¨rri
(2011)
Tax morale: always or
never justified—cheating
on tax payments if you
get the chance.
Trust in parliament,
government, legal
system; satisfaction with
political system and
incumbents; referendum
required for taxes
27 countries. Multi-
level ordered probit
World values
survey
1995–1997
Some evidence that trust
positively related to tax
morale. Incumbent
satisfaction is positively
related to tax morale.
Referendum institutions
do not have a direct
effect on the level of tax
morale across countries
Marien and
Hooghe
(2011)
Legal permissiveness—
scale from whether it is
always or never justified
to cheat on tax, pay cash
to avoid sales tax and
claim benefits to which
you are not entitled
Political trust—a scale
made from trust in
parliament, the justice
system, the armed forces
and the police;
religiosity; moral
conservatism
Individuals in 33
European countries.
Multi-level
multinomial logit
European
values survey
1999–2001
Political trust, religiosity
and moral conservatism
are negatively related to
legal permissiveness
Torgler
et al.
(2010)
Tax morale: always or
never justified—cheating
on tax payments if you
get the chance
Quality of governance
index (World Bank);
trust in parliament, trust
in justice system
Individuals in 30
European countries.
Ordered probit
model
European value
survey
1999/2000
All institutional
dimensions significant
Lago-Pen˜as
and Lago-
Pen˜as
(2010)
Tax morale: ‘‘citizens
should not cheat on their
taxes’’
Trust in politicians;
satisfaction with
democracy; ethnic
fractionalisation
Individuals in 17
European countries.
Multi-level
weighted ordered
logistic regression
European social
survey
2004–2005
Tax morale is stronger
with greater trust in
politicians and greater
satisfaction with
democracy. Ethnic
fractionalisation reduces
tax morale
Martı´nez-
Va´zquez
and
Torgler
(2009)
Tax morale: always or
never justified—cheating
on tax payments if you
get the chance
Trust in the parliament;
religiosity; national pride
Individuals in Spain.
Weighted ordered
probit estimation
World values
survey and
European
values survey:
1981, 1990,
1995 and
1999/2000
All institutional variables
are statistically
significant and positively
related to tax morale
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(normative, cognitive and regulatory) on institutions toge-
ther for the first time, we offer a more systematic view on
the multiple channels through which institutions can affect
tax morale. Next, we explore each aspect in more detail
and present our hypotheses.
Normative Perspective: Evaluation
of the Government
The Theoretical Framework: The Normative
Perspective
We relate the normative channel affecting tax morale and
tax evasion to business owner/managers’ evaluation of the
legitimacy and performance of political institutions, the
government and the tax authority. Paying taxes is a social
obligation towards the state. Citizens pay taxes to support
the state in order to receive benefits; the state, however, is
expected to act in a trustworthy and fair manner, a logic
that Frey and Torgler (2007) label as ‘‘conditional
cooperation’’.
Propensity to cooperate and to comply with prescribed
behaviour is affected by a sense of obligation (Murphy
2004), which is always either enhanced or reduced condi-
tional on the evaluation of the institution to which it relates.
Taxes are an obligation paid to the state through the tax
office providing money to be spent by the government.
Positive evaluation of state administration makes the
business owner/manager more likely to adopt a cooperative
strategy towards it (Marien and Hooghe 2011; Hug and
Spo¨rri 2011; De Castro et al. 2014). Paying taxes in full is
the key feature of such strategic choice, as it implies giving
back to the community via an intermediary authority that
the individual values and therefore sees its claims as
legitimate. However, if an individual does not consider the
recipients of these taxes (the tax office and the government)
trustworthy and honest, or does not believe the rules by
which the tax revenue is collected and/or spent to be fair,
this is likely to undermine a positive attitude towards full
Table 1 continued
Reference Dependent variable Institutional dimensions Sample and
econometrics
Source of data Findings
Blanthorne
and
Kaplan
(2008)
Ethics of underreporting.
Scale created from items:
underreporting against
principles; morally
wrong; not ethically
wrong; dishonest; and
not feeling guilty if
underreport
Social norms regarding
underreporting;
opportunity to
underreport
Individuals in USA
with different
levels of
opportunity to
evade tax
Own survey Social norms that
underreporting unethical
judge underreporting as
more unethical. Low
opportunity taxpayers,
who cannot easily benefit
personally from evasion,
judged evasion as more
unethical than high
opportunity taxpayers
Frey and
Torgler
(2007)
Tax morale: always or
never justified—cheating
on tax payments if you
get the chance
Trust in justice system,
parliament; satisfaction
with democracy;
institutional quality
Individuals in 30
West and East
European countries.
Weighted ordered
probit; clustered
standard errors
European
values survey
1999/2000
All institutional variables
are positively related to
tax morale
Torgler and
Schneider
(2007)
Tax morale: always or
never justified—cheating
on tax payments if you
get the chance
Trust in political
institutions and
government; attitudes
towards democracy;
direct democracy;
deterrence factors: fine
rate and audit
probability; national
pride; church attendance;
language
Individuals in
Belgium, Spain and
Switzerland.
Weighted ordered
probit estimation
World values
survey
1995–1997
and the
European
values survey
1999–2000
All trust variables, pro-
democratic attitudes,
national pride are
positively related to tax
morale. Direct
democracy positively
related to tax morale in
Switzerland, but
deterrence factors have
little effect. Religiosity is
only significant in
Belgium and
Switzerland. There are
some statistically
significant differences in
tax morale across
different language groups
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compliance and justify adopting a norm of non-compliance
(Alon and Hageman 2013; Kavka 1983; Kirchler et al.
2008; Murphy 2004; Scholz and Lubell 1998). In such
circumstances, the legitimacy of the government and of the
tax office is weakened.
Thus, the positive evaluation of the government makes
business owner/managers more likely to adopt cooperative
strategies of full tax compliance. In particular, perceptions
of the fairness of the government are important and are best
achieved by a lack of arbitrariness and favouritism in the
provision of government services. Poor practice of public
administration may lead to corruption and favouritism. The
latter may to some extent occur independently of the for-
mal quality of the legal system, which may be simply
disregarded by public servants. This possibility arises as
the behaviour of administrators is affected both by formal
frameworks and by informal norms, the latter tending to be
persistent (North 1990; Williamson 2000; Estrin et al.
2013).
The authority of the government may be further
undermined when the link between the state’s provision of
benefits to individuals and firms and their contribution in
taxes is perceived as broken (Welter and Smallbone 2011;
Alon and Hageman 2013). In this situation, firms may
migrate either partly or entirely beyond the sphere of
legality1 to the informal economy. Yet in the latter case
they may not be able to benefit from some of the govern-
ment services, for example, gaining recourse to the law as
the use of the courts requires some legal identity, which
firms that operate entirely outside the legal sphere will not
possess. This implies that a strategy of a partial rather than
full migration into the illegal economy is far more likely as
long as the government is not entirely dysfunctional and
business owners/managers do not face a failed state where
no public goods are effectively provided by the govern-
ment (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Previous literature
has found a positive relation of tax morale with trust in
public officials (Torgler 2003b), with politicians and with
overall satisfaction with the way the government and
political system function (Lago-Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as
2010; Marien and Hooghe 2011; Scholz and Lubell 1998;
Torgler et al. 2010). However, we stress the need to dis-
tinguish between the trust in government interpreted along
the lines discussed above (rather than in politicians) and the
specific impact of confidence in the tax system. We posit
that both confidence in the government and more specifi-
cally in those aspects of government most directly related
to taxes, such as the tax office and tax system, will affect
the tax morale of business owner/managers. These rela-
tionships are expressed in terms of two hypotheses that can
be tested empirically.
H1 Business owner/managers who express confidence in
the government have higher tax morale.
H2 Business owner/managers who express confidence in
the tax system as fair have higher tax morale.
The Transition Context and the Normative
Perspective: Evaluation of Government
The development of trust in the government is challenging
in institutional environments like Latvia, where govern-
ment structures have been rebuilt after a long period of
foreign occupation, or built from scratch. In such cases, a
lack of government legitimacy is reinforced by persisting
norms and values developed in the past, when government
had long been perceived as imposed without societal con-
sent. While newly formed political institutions may be
initially endowed with social approval, there may also be
incongruence between this potential approval and deeply
ingrained attitudes of mistrust. More generally, Torgler
(2003d) finds that nations such as Latvia, which were once
incorporated into the Soviet Union, exhibit lower levels of
tax morale compared to Central Eastern European ‘‘satel-
lite’’ communist countries. In particular, within the latter
group, East Germany has been characterised by an inher-
ited high level of trust (Torgler 2003e).
It is likely that the logic of mistrust applies in particular
to relations between the institutional actors representing the
state and business owners/managers (Welter 2012). Ireland
et al. (2008) stress how a communist legacy affects tran-
sitional economies via hostile attitudes towards
entrepreneurship; these attitudes are also deeply ingrained
in the practices of state officials, whose bureaucratic values
were formed under the old regime. These old values may
also continue to be reproduced within the government
administration.
The deeper roots of transition economies’ normative
traits relate to the political–institutional tradition, which
did not respect the autonomy of private enterprise, holding
that the rights to any economic surplus belong to the
political rulers who discretionarily licence limited rights to
private entrepreneurs in a form of privilege (Pipes 2000;
Estrin and Mickiewicz 2011). Within such a perspective,
the distinction between the collection of taxes and corrupt
extortion by politicians and administrators becomes blurred
(Pipes 2000). Such a heritage of norms and values can only
change gradually, undermining business owner/managers’
positive evaluation of the government. Thus, at the inter-
face between business owners/managers and the state
1 Here, the terminology developed by Webb et al. (2009) is adopted:
informal economy implies that both means and ends remain
legitimate, even if some elements within those are illegal (for
instance, illegal employment and related non-compliance in tax
payments). In contrast, socially illegitimate activities are labelled
‘renegade economy’.
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bureaucracy, the mistrust on both sides persists, which may
have the characteristics of a self-fulfilling prophecy
whereby neither side perceives an obligation to act in a way
that takes the interests of the other side into account.
In addition to longer-term factors, poor economic per-
formance during the transition period has been an impor-
tant factor further undermining legitimacy of the
government and, therefore, tax morale (Torgler 2003a;
Alm et al. 2006). In the context of our study, it is therefore
quite relevant that Latvia was hit particularly badly by the
global financial crisis. From 2003 to 2007, GDP average
yearly growth was 9.7%, but in 2009, GDP fell 18.0%; in
2010, when the data for our study were collected, Latvia
was still in recession with GDP growth at -0.3% (World
Bank Development Indicators). The severity of the eco-
nomic crisis is likely to have impacted on tax morale in
Latvia. Heinemann (2011) found that the incidence of
economic crisis (as measured by severe jumps in the yearly
unemployment rate) is negatively related to tax morale in
OECD countries. The impact of economic crises across
individuals and firms in a country is likely to be uneven,
with some suffering much more than others. Some busi-
nesses could feel that what happened to them was unfair
and their experiences during recession may have under-
mined the sense of reciprocity and solidarity that underpins
tax compliance. Thus, the firm-level impact of the crisis
may be negatively related to tax morale. Furthermore,
taxation impacts on business profitability. Some individu-
als may choose to evade tax in order to avoid improve
profitability. Hence, in analysing the tax morale of business
owners and managers, we should take this contextual factor
into account.
Cognitive–Cultural Perspective: National
Identification
The Theoretical Framework: The Cognitive
Perspective
The cultural–cognitive perspective draws upon anthropo-
logical approaches that ‘‘stress the centrality … of the
shared conceptions, which constitute the nature of social
reality and create the frames through which meaning is
made’’ (Scott 2014, p. 67). External cultural systems shape
individuals’ interpretation of their environment and pro-
vide guidance on how to act. Here, consistent with a link
between cognition and attitudes (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975;
Ajzen 2001; Mitchell et al. 2004), we stress that attitudes
towards taxes are expected to be affected by the strength of
the owner/manager’s identification with the national polity:
the shared concept of community linked to this polity
motivates some individuals to pay taxes as a way of con-
tributing to the community.
Consistent with this, payment of taxes may be driven by
the social identity (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Hogg and
Terry 2000) adopted by the owner/manager in particular
the owner/manager’s identification with the country to
which they pay taxes. Social identity implies that individ-
uals see themselves as members of a wider social group
and in their behaviour adopt the perspective of that group
(Hogg et al. 1995; Stets and Burke 2000). At a deep level
of identification, some forms of cooperative behaviour
become ‘‘taken for granted’’ and are no longer questioned;
in contrast, loose identification implies that non-compli-
ance is more likely (Scott 2014). Studies on tax morale
have found that indicators of social identity, such as
patriotism and nationalism, are positively associated with
tax morale (Heinemann 2011; Konrad and Qari 2012;
Martı´nez-Va´zquez and Torgler 2009); however, commu-
nity belonging may be considered a broader form of
identification with the national polity. As well as the
identification with the country that community belonging
entails, patriotism also involves love of one’s country,
special concern for its well-being, linked with a willingness
to sacrifice for the good of the country (Nathanson 1989).
Nationalism is similar to patriotism, but the former rejects
out-groups and the latter is more inclusive (Konrad and
Qari 2012) and community belong is more inclusive still as
more people are likely consider themselves as belonging to
a community than to identify as patriots or nationalists.
While patriotism and nationalism may be even more likely
to promote tax morale than community belonging because
they imply a more fervent attachment to the nation, we
argue that it is the key aspect for tax morale is identifica-
tion with the country. Accordingly, we emphasise the
importance of community belonging and it is hypothesised
that:
H3 Owner/managers who identify more strongly with
their country have higher tax morale.
The Transition Context and the Cognitive
Perspective: National Identity
Building a layer of social identity related to the state and
national polity may be particularly difficult in transition
countries, especially those, like Latvia, which regained
statehood or were created from scratch. Between 1918 and
1940, the newly created state of Latvia experienced a
period of independence only to be annexed into the Soviet
Union in 1940 as a result of a pact between Stalin and
Hitler. Latvia regained independence in 1991. However,
due to this history, the population of Latvia consists of two
main ethnic groups: Latvians and Russians. Although
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nowadays considered an ethnic minority, Russians living in
Latvia were not so considered between 1940 and 1991.
During that time, they were living in the Soviet Union,
where Russian was the official language and where Rus-
sians were the dominant ethnic group. When Latvia
became independent, this changed completely. This his-
torical context provides challenges in building an inclusive
Latvian national identity (Putnins and Sauka 2015, 2016).
Ireland et al. (2008) discuss how political identity is
built via political parties. They accentuate a possibility that
a programme of emphasising national identity may be
hijacked by populist movements leading to effects and
policies that are undesirable from the business and eco-
nomic point of view. This is obviously more dangerous
when this identity becomes affiliated with some ethnic
criteria, leading to marginalisation of some minority groups
and their dis-identification. While these dangers are very
real, at the other end of the spectrum is the situation where
building an elementary identification with the national
polity becomes a challenge. Miller (2000) emphasises the
positive benefits of national identity and solidarity, as long
as these respect the lower-layer separate identities of
minority groups. Where successful, such a model of
democratic polity leads to strong identity with the nation
and active citizenship, including business. In turn, this
implies that obligations towards the government are
respected and taxes are paid rather than avoided, which
adds to the arguments supporting Hypothesis 3 above.
Regulatory/Instrumental Perspective: Deterrence
The Theoretical Framework: The Regulatory
Perspective
Next, the regulatory–instrumental institutional perspective
focuses on the regulatory role of institutions—that is on the
role of formal institutions in shaping effective, explicit
constraints on human behaviour. Within this context,
attention is given to explicit regulatory processes—rule-
setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities (Scott 2014).
‘‘The institutional logic underlying the regulatory pillar is
an instrumental one: individuals conform to laws and rules
because they seek the attendant rewards or wish to avoid
sanctions’’ (Scott 2014, p. 62, 63). It is for this reason that
this perspective is typically adopted by institutional eco-
nomics (Williamson 2000) and, more broadly, by rational
choice theory scholars (Becker 1968). As applied to tax
evasion by business owner/managers, the regulatory–in-
strumental perspective implies a calculation of the cost-
benefits of non-compliance compared to paying tax.
The literature normally views tax morale as an ethical
characteristic, which influences tax compliance
independently of the effect of deterrence factors. However,
Heinemann (2011) and Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008)
argue that tax morale may be affected by an egocen-
tric/self-serving bias whereby people adjust their attitudes
according to their self-interest. In this way, deterrence
factors may influence the tax morale. This is consistent
with empirical results obtained by Blanthorne and Kaplan
(2008) that tax payers have lower tax morale in occupa-
tions where they are more likely to have an opportunity to
evade taxes than individuals with less opportunity for
evasion. Thus, while arguments related to deterrence are
well rehearsed, our application of those to the question of
tax morale is more novel. We argue that individuals’ cost-
benefit analysis of the deterrence factors against tax eva-
sion influences their tax morale as individuals typically
suffer from a self-serving bias whereby people adjust their
norms/attitudes according to their self-interest.
It is also important to keep in mind that perceptions
matter. Individuals hardly ever know the actual probabili-
ties associated with enforcement of sanctions for non-
compliance; thus, their perceptions are based on their local
experience. There may also be a considerable lag in the
way these perceptions respond to changes in tax adminis-
tration practice, an issue we will return to when discussing
the Latvian context.
Furthermore, perceptions about deterrence need not
have one-to-one correspondence with reality. Scholz and
Pinney (1995) argue that citizens who systematically
overestimate the likelihood of getting caught by the Inland
Revenue Service if they cheat also report a greater com-
mitment to tax laws (duty to pay taxes). Similarly, Alm
et al. (1992) find evidence in experimental data that some
individuals overweight the probability of being caught,
which to some extent explains the level of tax compliance.
It is likely that risk-averse individuals will express cogni-
tive bias perceiving the magnitude of punishment as higher
than actually observed in reality. Furthermore, it seems
plausible to assume that for more risk-averse individuals
the cost of punishment weighs more heavily than for the
less risk averse, which makes the distribution of outcomes
more skewed even if not necessarily increasing the
expected cost of punishment (where the latter is compen-
sated by lower frequency of being caught). The juxtapo-
sition of the impact of the likelihood of being caught and of
the cost of punishment that we introduce in this context is
novel. We posit that both aspects matter.
H4 Business owner/managers who perceive a greater
likelihood of being caught evading tax are likely to have a
higher tax morale.
H5 Business owner/managers who perceive tax evaders
to be more severely punished when caught are likely to
have higher tax morale.
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The Transition Context and the Regulatory
Perspective
As discussed by Torgler (2003a) and Alm et al. (2006),
under the Soviet system taxes were typically collected
indirectly; in particular, revenue was transferred from state
firms to other parts of government before wages were paid.
With transition, the separation of economic activity from
the state administration implied that the share of direct
taxes increased significantly, including the introduction of
individual tax returns (Alm et al. 2006). All this required
radically new tasks for the state administration, for which it
was not prepared. Implementing those reforms took sig-
nificant time, during which a vacuum resulting from the
implosion of the old regime was not yet fully replaced by
modern tax administration, leading to low effectiveness in
tax collection. Under such conditions, the significance of
deterrence factors may be low.
Though our study has been conducted almost twenty
years after transition started in Latvia, and tax adminis-
tration in the Baltic republics improved much faster than in
the rest of the former Soviet Union (Yew et al. 2015), it is
likely that some of those phenomena may still have an
impact. Moreover, it is not the actual effectiveness of the
tax administration, but perceptions of its effectiveness that
matter, as well as any additional significant lag in the latter
adjusting to the change in the former.
Methods
Data
To demonstrate the theoretical framework and test its
usefulness, the paper draws on a survey of business
owner/managers conducted in Latvia in winter 2010.
Information was obtained on all active firms in Latvia from
the Orbis database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. To
achieve representativeness, size quintiles were formed
(using book value of assets) and equal-sized random
samples were taken from each size quintile. In total, 279
phone interviews were conducted, either in Latvian or
Russian. Given the general mistrust in government dis-
cussed above, it was important that the study was con-
ducted on behalf of an academic institution, as data
collection by academics is met with a far more positive
response from business owner/managers. Informed consent
was obtained from all individual participants included in
the study. The resulting sample consists of companies with
a number of employees ranging from 1 to 300, with the
median at 4 and the mean value of 15 employees; thus, it
focuses on micro- and small-sized firms.
As tax evasion is a very sensitive topic, researchers have
not yet achieved consensus on which methods are best
suited to measuring the nature and the quantity of tax
evasion behaviour. This study builds on the empirical
approach of those previous studies that have used surveys
and employed various techniques in order to gain more
truthful responses. In particular, as suggested by Ge¨rxhani
(2007), a gradual approach is adopted, moving from less
sensitive questions to more sensitive ones that deal with tax
evasion. Also followed is the suggestion by Hanousek and
Palda (2004) to frame the study as research on perceptions
of government policy, not on tax evasion. Furthermore, as
Sauka (2008) shows, interviewing by phone is an appro-
priate tool to explore tax evasion, particularly in environ-
ments where tax evasion is accepted behaviour, which is
the case in Latvia (Torgler 2003d).
The dependent variable, tax morale, measures whether
respondents think it is justifiable to cheat on tax if one has
the chance. The question is taken from the World Values
Survey (WVS) and has been used widely in research on tax
evasion (see discussion in Torgler 2016). Marien and
Hooghe (2011) show why applying direct questions about
deviant behaviour leads to biased results, due to respon-
dents’ unwillingness to report it. Tax morale (alternatively
labelled ‘‘legal permissiveness’’) is a more robust way to
make inferences about tax evasion as it has been found to
correlate highly with actual behaviour yet should be less
subject to bias in reporting than asking directly if the
individual evades taxes (Marien and Hooghe 2011, p. 274).
The original response is measured on a ten-point Likert
scale where 1 means the respondent thinks it is always
justifiable and 10 means the respondent thinks it is never
justifiable to evade tax (Table 2).
The first two hypotheses relate to the normative evalu-
ation of both the government’s spending of revenue col-
lected via taxes and of the tax authorities’ behaviour. For
Hypothesis 1, a standard measure of trust in government is
used, which again is copied from the WVS (see also:
Marien and Hooghe 2011; Hug and Spo¨rri 2011). For
Hypothesis 2, Cronbach’s alpha confirms that the best way
to proceed is to aggregate the three individual questions
related to trust in tax authorities into a three-item scale
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71; details in Table 2).
To measure social identity (cultural-cognitive perspec-
tive) for Hypothesis 3, respondents were asked if ‘‘be-
longing to the Latvian community’’ is important to them,
following Wenzel (2005). The word ‘‘community’’ is used
instead of ‘‘nation’’ in order to try to capture a wider civic
notion of identification with Latvia which can include eth-
nic Russians as well as ethnic Latvians. While in some
countries the nation is seen as ethnically neutral and
belonging to the nation is based on citizenship, in others
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such as Latvia, ethnicity plays a more prominent role in
defining who is included in the nation (Bjo¨rklund 2006).
Nationalities are associated with ethnic groups—Latvian
and Russian. This follows on from the Soviet era intro-
duction of nationalities as an ethnic-based identity, which
was allowed alongside being a citizen of the Soviet Union
and provided the basis for creating republics within the
Soviet Union (Kolstø 2000). Our survey instrument related
to ‘‘Latvian community’’ may be seen as akin to those that
assess different dimensions of the government (as discussed
above, for H1–H2), yet the logic is different, being based on
social identity theory, which is linked to the cognitive
institutional perspective, as argued in the previous section.
For testing Hypothesis 4 (regulatory–instrumental
aspects), a scale was constructed based on the respondent’s
assessment of the likelihood being caught not paying tax
Table 2 Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean Median SD Min Max
Tax morale (dependent variable
for OLS and ordered probit ten
models)
Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can
always be justified, never be justified or something in between:
‘‘Cheating on tax if you have the chance’’: 1 means you think it is
always justifiable; 10 means you think it is never justifiable; and if
your views fall somewhere in between you can choose any
number in between
6.10 6 2.63 1 10
Confidence in government How much confidence do you have in the government? 4 = a great
deal, 3 = quiet a lot, 2 = not very much, 1 = none at all (WVS)
2.10 2 0.95 1 4
Confidence in tax authorities Scale formed from average answer to 3 statements: The state
revenue service: (1) is corrupt (reverse coded); (2) administers the
tax system fairly; (3) is generally honest in the way it deals with
people: 5 = strongly agree 1 = strongly disagree
3.14 3.33 0.96 1 5
Community belonging Being a member of the Latvian community is important to me:
5 = strongly agree 1 = strongly disagree
4.53 5 0.84 1 5
Chances of being caught Scale formed by adding respondent’s assessment of chance of being
caught for each type of underreporting—business incomes,
number of employees, official salary levels. Chance of firm being
caught: 1 = about 0%, 2 = about 25%, 3 = about 50%,
4 = about 75%, 5 = almost certain, 100%
3.36 3 1.06 1 5
Severity of punishment If a firm did get caught seriously underreporting how severe are the
typical consequences: 1 = not severe at all, minimal impact,
2 = it will suffer some financial penalties, 3 = it will suffer
serious financial penalties and become unprofitable, 4 = it will
suffer serious financial penalties and may go out of business,
5 = it will go out of business
3.10 3 0.90 1 5
Female Male = 0, female = 1 0.55 1 0.50 0 1
High education Education: BA or higher = 1 otherwise = 0 0.29 0 0.45 0 1
Age Age of respondent 42.53 40 9.98 23 75
Latvian Ethnicity of respondent Latvian = 1, other ethnicity = 0 0.79 1 0.41 0 1
No. of employees Number of employees in 2010 14.11 5 28.80 1 245
Capital city Firm based in capital Riga = 1, based elsewhere in Latvia = 0 0.56 1 0.50 0 1
Foreign share Some foreign share in ownership 0.03 0 0.18 0 1
Services 1 or 0 0.57 1 0.50 0 1
Manufacturing 1 or 0 0.09 0 0.28 0 1
Wholesale trade 1 or 0 0.04 0 0.19 0 1
Retail trade 1 or 0 0.19 0 0.39 0 1
Other sector 1 or 0 0.10 0 0.30 0 1
Performance 2009–2010 Average of approximate % change in three variables: net sales
profit, sales turnover, and employment in 2010 compared to 2007.
Each of these variables is measured on a scale from 1 to
5 = considerably increased: more than ?40%, 4 = increased: up
to ?40%, 3 = remained the same, 2 = decreased: down to
-40%, 1 = considerably decreased: more than -40%
2.55 2.3 0.83 1 5
Performance 2007–2010 Question same as above except compared to 2007 2.24 2 0.85 1 5
T. Mickiewicz et al.
123
with respect to income (profits), number of employees and
employees’ salaries. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.83, indicating
that these three items perform well as a scale. The scale,
chances of being caught, is formed of the average of the
respondent’s assessment of chance of being caught for each
type of underreporting—business incomes, number of
employees, official salary levels and dividing by three.
Finally, Hypothesis 5 is tested using a one-item Likert
scale, severity of punishment, which simply asks about the
respondent’s perceptions of the severity of punishment.
Details of all these measures are provided in Table 2.
Controls are included for respondent age, gender, eth-
nicity, education, business experience, change in firm
performance from 2007 to 2010, as well as (alternatively)
from 2009 to 2010, firm size (proxied by number of
employees), regional fixed effects and sector fixed effects.
For further details on the variables included in the esti-
mation models, please see Table 2.
There are further controls for gender, as according to
previous findings women tend to have higher tax morale
than men (Alm et al. 2010; Marien and Hooghe 2011), an
effect attributed by Wei and McGee (2015) and Preobra-
genskaya and McGee (2016) to the way women are
enculturated to defer to authority. Likewise, age is inclu-
ded, as older individuals are generally found to have higher
tax morale (Frey and Torgler 2007; Alm et al. 2010; Lago-
Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as 2010; Torgler 2012; Preobragen-
skaya and McGee 2016). This effect may be weaker for
transition economies, such as Latvia, as an age effect
overlaps with generational effects—older respondents are
more likely to retain attitudes learned under the Soviet
period (Ireland et al. 2008; Estrin and Mickiewicz 2011).
We include education as in earlier studies; however, the
direction of the effect has been found to be either positive
(Frey and Torgler 2007; Marien and Hooghe 2011; Yew
et al. 2015), ambiguous (Alm et al. 2006) or negative
(Lago-Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as 2010; Torgler 2006; Preo-
bragenskaya and McGee 2016).
Respondents’ ethnicity is included as a control as it may
influence tax morale in Latvia due to the historical factors
that formed the present day large Russian ethnic minority as
described earlier. Due to this history, the Russian minority
may have a different relationship with the Latvian state than
ethnic Latvians, leading to lower tax morale. Respondents’
ethnicity has not been included in previous research on tax
morale; however, Lago-Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as (2010) found
that individuals have a lower tax morale in countries with
higher ethnic–linguistic fractionalisation.
To control for the impact of the economic crisis, a
variable measuring the change in firm performance from
2009 to 2010 and from 2007 to 2010 is included. Perfor-
mance is measured along three dimensions: changes in
profit, sales turnover and employment. Each dimension is
measured on a scale of one to five, with the average score
for these three dimensions used as the measure of firm
performance. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.84, indicating that
these three dimensions perform well as a scale.
At the same time, there are arguments that suggest the
opposite effect of performance on tax morale: an
improvement in firm performance could also reduce tax
morale. As performance increases, the opportunity cost of
compliance becomes greater. Taking the view that norms
have a self-serving bias, tax morale will fall as the
opportunity cost of paying taxes (i.e. the opportunity cost
of high tax morale) increases (Heinemann 2011). Increases
in individuals’ income have been found to be negatively
related to tax morale in empirical studies (Heinemann
2011; Lago-Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as 2010; Torgler 2003c;
Yew et al. 2015).
Estimator and Specifications
The dependent variable, tax morale, is ordinal and has a
limited range of values running from 1 to 10. This poses
some problems for using OLS regression primarily because
(1) distances between each category cannot be assumed to
be equal and (2) OLS may product predicted values that
fall outside the range of 1–10. Ordered probit models
recognise that the categories of the dependent variable have
an underlying ordering, but that the distances between
adjacent categories are not known; these models also
ensure that any predictions are limited to the range of the
dependent variable (Greene and Hensher 2010; Long
1997). However, some econometricians still prefer OLS as
the coefficients from ordered probit are much harder to
interpret (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Consequently, many
researchers with dependent variables that have 7 or more
categories prefer to use OLS. In this study, for each
specification coefficients are estimated using both OLS and
ordered probit in order to ensure robustness as well as to
aid interpretation of the results.
Post-estimation diagnostics do not indicate any cause for
concern in using an OLS distribution. The residuals appear
reasonably normally distributed; there is no evidence of
skewness, nor of any severe outlying residuals, although
kurtosis is a slight issue, as the distribution of the residuals
is flatter than a normal distribution. However, the Breusch–
Pagan test for heteroskedasticity does not reject the null of
constant variance in the residuals. In any case, robust
standard errors are applied in all specifications to ensure
that the hypothesis tests are valid.
The robustness of the OLS results was checked by
comparing them to results obtained from running an
ordered probit model. When a 10-category version of the
dependent variable, tax morale, was used for the ordered
probit regressions, the data did not meet the parallel
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regression assumption that only the intercepts vary across
the different categories (not reported but available on
request). To overcome this problem, categories were
combined to create a tax morale variable with three cate-
gories. This also has the added benefit of the results being
easier to interpret. For the recoded version of tax morale, 1
represents individuals who think tax evasion is accept-
able (initial responses 1–3), 2 represents those without
strong feelings on the subject (responses 4–7), and category
3 represents individuals who believe that tax evasion is
never acceptable (responses 8–10). As in ordered regres-
sion, the estimated slope parameters are assumed to remain
the same across categories: combining adjacent categories
should not affect the coefficients (Murad et al. 2003). The
three-category dependent variable does not violate the
parallel regressions assumptions of ordered probit, unlike
the ten-category dependent variable. Furthermore, this
recoding attenuates a potential measurement bias resulting
from the fact that different individuals may attach different
weight to the relative differences between categories. See
Table 3 for coding details and summary statistics of the
dependent variable.
While deciding on our models’ specifications, we con-
sidered two further, standard empirical problems. The first
is multicollinearity, while the second concerns the trade-off
between the longer specification and the effective sample
size. Multicollinearity was checked by calculating the
variance inflation factors (VIFs). There was no evidence of
its presence from the VIFs—the mean VIF was 1.13 and
the maximum 1.25. However, in addition to VIFs, the
model-specific underlying structure of correlations within
the set of explanatory variables was explored further by
calculating partial correlation coefficients (on which VIFs
are based) for each of the key variables of interest. Not
surprisingly, the two past performance measures for
2007–2010 and 2009–2010 are characterised by a high
partial correlation coefficient of 0.71. In addition, perfor-
mance change in 2009–2010 and foreign share in owner-
ship are also related, indicating that those firms responded
to the crisis in a different way than domestic ones (partial
correlation at 0.37). Multicollinearity between other vari-
ables did not seem to be an issue even when assessed by
partial correlation coefficients.
The second problem relates to the high number of
missing observations for past performance which reduces
the effective sample size from 220 to 185 for 2009–2010
performance measures and even further reduces it to 159
for 2007–2010 performance measures.
Accordingly, several specifications of the model are
presented (see Table 3). Model 1 includes only the control
variables. Model 2 is extended by adding the institutional
variables, which are the focus of this paper. It includes all
explanatory variables except past performance, to take
advantage of more information embedded in the larger
sample size. Further tests include model 3 with the
2009–2010 performance measure and model 4 with the
2007–2010 performance measure. Models 3 and 4 come at
the cost of a smaller sample size. As neither performance
variable is statistically significant, model 2 is the preferred
specification. The results of model 2 are robust to running
on the smallest sample size—the 159 observations used to
estimate model 4. These results are reported in model 5.
Results
Visualising the Results
The complete results for all five models using both OLS
and ordered probit for the 3-category measure of tax
morale are presented in Table 4. We report standardised
beta coefficients for the OLS models to allow for com-
parison of effect sizes. The adjusted R2 of the OLS model
increases considerably from -0.01 in model 1 (which
excludes the institutional variables) to 0.12 in model 2 (to
which the institutional variables are added). While much of
the variance is still left unexplained, this increase indicates
the importance of institutional variables in explaining tax
morale.
Another method of presenting the effects of the key
independent variables on the dependent variable, tax
morale (the 3-category version), in the ordered probit
models is to plot the predicted probabilities of each cate-
gory of tax morale for given values of a key independent
variable, holding all the others fixed at their mean values
(Greene and Hensher 2010; Long 1997). Predicted proba-
bilities are calculated for an individual’s level of tax
morale for the three levels of tax morale, on the basis of
estimates from model 2 in the regression table. These
predictions are plotted in Fig. 2 which consists of four
Table 3 Recoding of
dependent variable, tax morale,
from ten categories to three
categories with summary
statistics of the three-category
variable
Value Meaning WVS value Frequency Percent
1 Tax evasion justifiable 1–3 41 18.6
2 4–7 104 47.3
3 Tax evasion not justifiable 8–10 75 34.1
N = 220
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Table 4 Regression results: dependent variable tax morale
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OLS OP OLS OP OLS OP OLS OP OLS OP
Trust in government 0.17** 0.18* 0.15* 0.14 0.18* 0.15? 0.18* 0.15?
(-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.20) (-0.09) (0.20) (0.09)
Trust in tax administration 0.15? 0.23* 0.15? 0.23* 0.18* 0.25* 0.17* 0.24*
(-0.20) (-0.10) (-0.22) (-0.11) (-0.23) (-0.12) (0.23) (0.12)
Community belonging 0.17** 0.26** 0.13? 0.23* 0.12 0.17 0.13? 0.20?
(-0.20) (-0.10) (-0.21) (-0.11) (-0.25) (-0.12) (0.24) (0.12)
Likelihood caught 0.08 0.12 0.14? 0.19* 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.13
(-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.22) (-0.11) (0.21) (0.11)
Severity of punishment 0.15* 0.21* 0.15* 0.21* 0.19* 0.26* 0.18* 0.25*
(-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.20) (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.10) (0.21) (0.10)
Female -0.03 -0.14 -0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 -0.14
(0.38) (0.17) (-0.35) (-0.17) (-0.38) (-0.19) (-0.41) (-0.20) (0.41) (0.20)
Age 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Higher education 0.09 0.25 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.11
(0.42) (0.18) (-0.40) (-0.19) (-0.43) (-0.21) (-0.46) (-0.22) (0.46) (0.22)
Ethnic Latvian 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.15 -0.00 -0.17 0.03 -0.11 0.02 -0.15
(0.43) (0.19) (-0.45) (-0.22) (-0.48) (-0.24) (-0.49) (-0.25) (0.50) (0.25)
No. of employees -0.05 -0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Capital city 0.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.10 -0.05 -0.24 -0.02 -0.25 -0.02 -0.24
(0.39) (0.17) (-0.39) (-0.18) (-0.42) (-0.19) (-0.44) (-0.20) (0.44) (0.20)
Foreign share 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.1 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.53 0.03 0.27
(0.55) (0.34) (-0.40) (-0.29) (-0.44) (-0.30) (-0.63) (-0.38) (0.45) (0.34)
Manufacturing -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.06
(0.86) (0.33) (-0.79) (-0.34) (-0.84) (-0.36) (-0.93) (-0.42) (0.96) (0.43)
Wholesale trade 0.10 0.99? 0.12* 1.28** 0.12? 1.26** 0.09 1.04* 0.11 1.16*
(1.16) (0.58) (-0.79) (-0.44) (-0.82) (-0.46) (-0.89) (-0.50) (0.84) (0.48)
Retail trade 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.06
(0.46) (0.20) (-0.44) (-0.21) (-0.47) (-0.21) (-0.50) (-0.22) (0.50) (0.22)
Other sector 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.18 0.08 0.49 0.07 0.35 0.08 0.39
(0.55) (0.24) (-0.55) (-0.25) (-0.62) (-0.32) (-0.62) (-0.33) (0.64) (0.33)
Performance change
2009–2010
-0.02 -0.09
(-0.22) (-0.10)
Performance change
2007–2010
-0.10 -0.17
(-0.23) (-0.10)
Constant 4.32*** -1.44 -0.72 -0.26 -1.10
(0.99) (-1.33) (-1.59) (-1.78) (1.58)
Observations 220 220 220 220 185 185 159 159 159 159
Adjusted/pseudo-R-squared -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10
Log-likelihood -222.4 -204.94 -171.4 -147.3 -148.2
For OLS coefficients standardised betas are reported; OP = ordered probit
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses
*** p\ 0.001, ** p\ 0.01, * p\ 0.05, ? p\ 0.10
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graphs, one for each independent variable: trust in gov-
ernment, trust in tax administration, community belonging
and severity of punishment, relevant for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3
and 4. The plot shows how the probability of an average
individual holding these views varies with a change in an
independent variable. The horizontal axis indicates the
value of the independent variable at which the predicted
probability of the tax morale outcome is calculated. The
vertical axis indicates the values of the predicted proba-
bilities for each tax morale outcome. Each panel has three
lines plotting the relationship between tax morale and the
relevant independent variable. There is one line for each of
the three categories of tax morale: tax evasion justifiable
(solid line), tax evasion not justifiable (dotted line), neutral
position (dashed line).
To illustrate how to read these graphs, let us examine
Panel B, which shows the relationship between an indi-
vidual’s trust in the tax administration and their tax morale,
holding all other variables constant. The solid line in Panel
B represents the predicted probability that an average
individual thinks tax evasion is justifiable, when trust in tax
administration is very low (x axis = 1), the predicted
probability of thinking tax evasion is justified is 0.30. As
trust in the tax administration increases (x increases) the
probability that an average individual thinks tax evasion is
justifiable falls, so much so that when trust in the tax
authorities is very high (x = 5) the predicted probability
that an individual will think tax evasion is justifiable falls
to 0.08. This same trend is seen in each panel: high values
of the independent variable make the response ‘‘tax evasion
is justified’’ less likely (the solid lines have negative slopes
on each panel) and the answers corresponding to rejection
of tax evasion more likely (the dotted lines have positive
slopes for each panel).
Empirical Support for the Hypotheses
H1 (trust in government) and H2 (trust in the tax admin-
istration) are supported. Trust in government is statistically
significant in all models except the 3-category ordered
probit specification of model 3. The result for trust in tax
administration is even more robust—it has a positive
impact on tax morale across all specifications and is sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level except in the first two
OLS specifications, where the statistical significance is
lower. The result is robust to variance in sample size. In
Panel B (Fig. 2), the positive relation between trust in the
tax administration and tax morale is shown. The predicted
probability of thinking tax evasion is justified falls from
0.30, when there is no trust in the tax administration, to
0.08 when there is very high trust. A mirror effect is that
the predicted probability of ‘‘tax evasion is not justified’’
increases from 0.09 to 0.22. A similar pattern in predicted
probabilities can be seen in Panel A (Fig. 2) when con-
sidering the impact of changes in trust in government on
tax morale. The predicted probability of ‘‘tax evasion is
justified’’ falls from 0.21 when the respondent expresses no
trust in government to 0.09 when there is a great deal of
trust in the government. Similarly, the predicted probability
of ‘‘tax evasion is not justified’’ rises from 0.25 to 0.45.
Fig. 2 Predicted probability
plots for 3-category version of
tax morale
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Community belonging, the variable that captures the
social identification with the Latvian polity, comes as
significant and positive in models 2, 3 and 5, providing
support for H3. It only becomes insignificant in model 4
with the inclusion of firm performance between 2007 and
2010. In Panel C (Fig. 2), the plotted predicted probabili-
ties show the positive relation between cultural identity and
tax morale. The plot indicates that an owner/manager’s
identification with Latvian community has the strongest
negative effect on the predicted probabilities of ‘‘tax eva-
sion is justified’’. The probabilities fall from 0.47 when the
community belonging is weak to 0.12 when it is strong.
Finally, with respect to deterrence factors, there are
clear differences between likelihood of being caught (H4)
and severity of punishment (H5). While there is significant
support for H4 only in model 3, H5 is not rejected as the
coefficient on severity of punishment is significant in all
models. The positive relationship between tax morale and
severity of punishment (H5) is depicted in the plot of pre-
dicted probabilities in Panel D (Fig. 2). As beliefs about
the severity of punishment increase from ‘‘minimal
impact’’ (1) to ‘‘serious, possibly leading to business clo-
sure’’ (5), the predicted probability of ‘‘tax evasion is jus-
tified’’ falls from 0.29 to 0.08, and the predicted probability
of ‘‘tax evasion is not justified’’ increases from 0.18 to
0.48.
Estimated Effects of Control Variables
With respect to controls, performance coefficients come as
insignificant [in models (3) and (4)]. There is also no
indication that employment size is statistically significant
for tax morale. Sectoral differences are not significant apart
from the ‘‘wholesale’’ category, which becomes significant
and positive in some of the specifications, but this is hard to
interpret. Location of the company plays no significant
role.
Interestingly, none of the demographic variables such as
age, gender, education, that are normally found to be
related to tax morale, are significant in this research. A
priori, age was expected to have an effect because of dif-
ferences between those who grew up and lived under
communism and those that did not. Ethnicity was also
expected to be significant due to divisions between ethnic
Russians and ethnic Latvians in Latvia, but we found no
support for either.
Discussion and Conclusions
As argued above, tax evasion matters for development at
both the national and the regional level. It may lead to a
prisoner’s dilemma situation where those who report more
of their incomes face unfair competition from those who
report less. Therefore, it may result in a vicious circle,
where only firms that cannot avoid taxes stay fully in the
official sector, and the government may be tempted to
increase tax rates to compensate for low compliance. In
that case, the situation becomes very difficult for entre-
preneurs in the formal sector, who face both competition
from the informal economy firms and high costs if they
choose to remain fully in the official domain. If such a
situation is left unchecked, a more serious crisis may fol-
low, as vividly exemplified by the recent case of Greece
(Estrin and Mickiewicz 2012; see also: Bird et al. 2006;
Mathias et al. 2015).
These wider considerations motivate this study. The first
objective is to focus on analysing the tax morale of busi-
ness owner/managers and to build on the literature from
public finance on tax morale to deepen our understanding
of informality in business. The second objective presents a
uniform theoretical framework within which the factors
which affect the tax morale of business owner–managers
may be analysed. By applying Scott’s framework, we
highlight three different mechanisms—normative, cogni-
tive and regulatory—and by doing so we are able bring
together the literature on institutions and tax morale and
show that the regulatory mechanisms matter not only for
tax evasion but for tax morale as well. Testing this
framework in Latvian context provides some tentative
evidence on the factors affecting the tax morale of business
owner/managers in challenging institutional environments
and explains what encourages them to use illegal means to
produce their legal products.
We find that tax morale is affected by institutions
through all three of the institutional mechanisms identified
by Scott (2014): the normative—trust in the government
and in the tax system; the cognitive—identification with
the wider polity; and the regulatory—perceptions of
deterrence. Broadly speaking, tax morale is enhanced by
confidence in the ways the taxes are collected and spent.
Likewise, robust evidence was found that the evaluation of
tax collection as being honest, not corrupt and administered
fairly is associated with higher tax morale (Torgler et al.
2008). Taken together, these factors imply that the gov-
ernment, which is by default legal, may or may not achieve
social legitimacy. That matters, because in turn, the lack of
social legitimacy makes adoption of tax evasion strategies
by entrepreneurs more likely.
Legitimacy of the government is enhanced, where citi-
zens execute their rights to decide on fiscal matters in an
effective way. Torgler (2005) makes a strong case arguing
that ‘‘direct democratic rules signal that citizens are neither
ignorant nor uncomprehending voters, which creates or
maintains a certain social capital stock’’ (Ibid.: 526). His
results for Switzerland demonstrate clearly that the single
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most important factor associated with high tax morale is a
decentralised institutional setting, where fiscal referenda
serve as a way to establish direct control of citizens over
taxes (Torgler 2005, 529). In addition, improving the image
of the tax authority, procedural fairness and providing
taxpayers with information on how taxes are spent may
also be effective ways to combat informality amongst
business owner/managers in particular (Alm and McClellan
2012; McGee et al. 2016).
Turning now to the second dimension we emphasised,
our results suggest that although business owner/managers
may be critical of tax administration and of how tax rev-
enues are handled and spent by the government and may
observe non-compliance around, their tax morale may still
hold up due to their sense of belonging to the polity and
identification with the wider community. This is parallel to
the results obtained by Konrad and Qari (2012) on patri-
otism and national pride as a factor in tax morale, yet we
believe that our focus on identity highlights a more fun-
damental factor as community belonging is a more inclu-
sive form of identification with a country.
Last but not least, we build on limited evidence, which
suggests that tax morale may be affected by a self-serving/
egocentric bias (Blanthorne and Kaplan 2008), in line with
the regulatory–instrumental institutional logic of deter-
rence. We find that the perceived consequences of tax
evasion affect tax morale, but we add to the literature as
our study suggests that the severity of punishment matters
more than likelihood of being caught. So far, the evidence
on the relative weight of these two factors was only based
on experimental studies (for overview, see: Torgler 2002),
but we believe our complementary survey-based results are
of additional value. Our findings are consistent with the
standard-risk avoidance perspective where the expected
cost of tax evasion depends on the risk of detection and the
size of the ensuing financial losses. It has also obvious
policy implications for shaping the parameters of formal
policy aimed at reducing tax evasion and avoidance.
At the same time, however, two caveats are worth
keeping in mind. First, our results suggest that identity,
legitimacy of the government and the tax authorities in
particular trump the impact of deterrence. This is consistent
with this branch of the literature, which shifts away from
the impact of widespread sanctions towards the emphasis
on ‘‘vertical reciprocity’’ and ‘‘psychological’’ contract
characterising the relationship between the individual and
the state (for overview, see: Alm et al. 2010). Second, a
heavy-handed use of sanctions may backfire, especially if it
is not perceived as fair (e.g. hard punishment of minor tax
mistakes versus effective impunity for large-scale trans-
gressors). For better or worse, tax morale will remain
‘‘quasi-voluntary’’; moreover, excessive use of punishment
may crowd-out intrinsic motivation of tax payers, render-
ing a policy counterproductive (Yew et al. 2015).
In addition to the conclusions related directly to tax
morale, the study demonstrates the advantages of adopting
a broader institutional theory framework. The informal
economy is a key topic of entrepreneurial research where
multidisciplinary contributions are particularly relevant.
The theoretical framework of this study includes both
rational–instrumental elements based on regulatory and
formal institutional perspective, as typically applied in
economics, and also normative and cognitive perspectives,
as promoted by neo-institutionalist sociologists (Scott
2014).
While it has been long recognised that institutions affect
individual behaviour and economic outcomes (e.g. North
1990; Williamson 2000), a sharper focus on specific types
of agents, such as small business owner/managers, provides
a more detailed understanding of how agents’ behaviour is
shaped by the institutional context. Adopting this approach,
this study illustrates how owner/managers’ relations with
their institutional context affects their behaviour via cog-
nition, values and instrumental/rational calculus. This
demonstrates the effectiveness of broadening institutional
analysis in business research to include culture and norms,
as promoted for example by Harper (2003).
The limitations of the study are evident. The sample size
is limited and there is no panel element. Moreover, while
the theoretical framework could be applied to other chal-
lenging institutional contexts, the results may be to some
extent context specific. Compared to other transition
countries, Latvia has been found to have particularly low
tax morale. Torgler (2012) reports that Latvia had the
lowest tax morale of EU new member states in 2008, and
the extent of tax evasion contrasts negatively with the two
neighbouring Baltic republics, Estonia and Lithuania
(Putnins and Sauka 2015). There is also some indication
that similarly to the two other Baltic republics and
Romania, tax morale actually decreased in Latvia between
1999 and 2010 (Putnins and Sauka 2015; Torgler 2012).
This shows why from a policy perspective it is important to
understand better the patterns behind these processes.
While we believe that our results have wider signifi-
cance, Latvia is an interesting context in which to study tax
morale, representing a fascinating case of institutional
change, where market supporting institutions were rebuilt
following the collapse of the Soviet economic experiment.
In such environments, the problem that the reforming
government faces relates to the inertia in social attitudes
(Estrin and Mickiewicz 2011) and social perceptions. Even
if the government changes the way it operates, the per-
ceptions of business owner/managers would lag behind
and, as expectations in an institutional context always have
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some self-fulfilling prophecies, this makes reform difficult.
Special attention needs to be paid to measures restoring
trust between officials and owner/managers of private
businesses. Unlike East Germany (see: Torgler 2003e),
Latvia and other transition countries could not ‘‘import’’
the legitimacy of the government and the tax authorities
from elsewhere.
All this calls for more investigation. Possible further
studies may also follow Culiberg and Bajde’s (2014,
p. 271) advice; they emphasise that: ‘‘… there is a shortage
of tax morale studies that explore ethical decision making
as a process composed of multiple steps and determinants’’.
While in some circumstances, entrepreneurs may find
ingenious way to organise themselves in parallel to inept
state bureaucracies, such organisation comes with high
transaction costs. Therefore, the superior, first-best solution
is always a sound tax system matched by a government that
supports property rights and creates uniform opportunities
for business (De Soto 1989, 2001). An informal economy is
detrimental to entrepreneurship (De Paula and Scheinkman
2011; Estrin and Mickiewicz 2012), and therefore, under-
standing the factors that drive tax morale, especially in the
business context, is critical.
All procedures performed in studies involving human
participants were in accordance with the ethical standards
of the institutional and/or national research committee and
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amend-
ments or comparable ethical standards.
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